WILLIAM BRATTON
Interview by Joe Diamond
As Police Commissioner of New York City from 1994 to
1996, William Bratton significantly lowered crime by using new police strategies
that focused on "quality of life" problems as well as major crimes and put 6,000
more police officers on the city's streets. The result was the stunning
announcement that in Bratton's first year in office, murders fell 19 percent and
robberies and auto theft fell 15 percent; Crime fell in each of the city's 76
precincts and decreased the most in poorer neighborhoods plagued by crime. At
the same time, 73 percent of New Yorkers reported that they felt positively
about their police department-32 percent higher than the national average.
Bratton recently resigned from his position to start his own security
business.
OnPatrol was lucky enough to catch William Bratton during one
of his few free moments to ask him about his tricks of the trade.
Q: When did you first become an adherent of the "Broken Windows"
theory?
A: As a sergeant, then a lieutenant, I ran a neighborhood
policing program in one of the busiest police districts in Boston. I saw
firsthand in one of the city's most crime-ridden areas that my perception as a
police officer of what was on people's minds-rape, murder, burglary-was very
different than what the public was really thinking about: the prostitute that
was in the hallway of the apartment building, or the kids drinking on the
corner, or the noisy parties, or the graffiti. It was an eye opener for me. What
the public wanted us to deal with were things that affected their quality of
life.
That was 1977, '78, '79. The "Broken Windows" article came out in 1982. A couple of skilled writers and respected criminologists wrote about an experiment in which they parked a new, undamaged car in an area. For days it sat there and nobody bothered it. But then they parked a car there with some damage, a broken window, with the hood up, and in a couple of days it was stripped. The idea was that the first broken window led to other things. When I read it, I thought, "Wow, this is what I've been espousing."
The idea really is that simple. The first person that painted the first
piece of graffiti on a train in New York encouraged the next person, who
thought, "Well Johnny's got his name there. I'm gonna put my name there." The
first person who was allowed to sell dope on the street without the cops
stopping him emboldened someone else. You can see how it builds from there.
Q: When you became New York City's Police Commissioner, you said something to the effect of: "We will fight for every house, we will fight for every block, we will fight for every neighborhood, and we will win!" Immediately the press started comparing you to Churchill.
A: Churchill is somebody that, as a kid growing up, I read a lot about. Something that I'm both complimented on and criticized about is my awareness of the press, of how to work with them, of being very mindful of their importance to any police manager.
Successful police executives today have to be good at many things and one
of them is the sound bite. In dealing with the media, you have to seize the
moment. That particular comment [about fighting for every street] said it all.
That sound bite gave made it clear that no issue would be too small for us to
focus on, that we would not give up any part of the city. Two years later, I
think we'd delivered on that promise. The areas of the city that had the
greatest decline in crime were the most troubled areas. Just before I left,
plans that we'd worked on for several years for major anti-drug initiatives were
underway. Using the war analogy again, I likened it to as if we'd "seized the
beaches of Normandy" and were now moving into hedgerow country. We literally
pushed the drug dealers off the streets in most neighborhoods. Many of them were
now entrenched in buildings. And now it was going to be like hedgerow combat-you
have to work very differently and much harder to get in and get them out of
those buildings.
By seizing the streets, you do several things. One, you show success,
rather than the abject failure of drug dealers on every corner. So it reinforces
in the public's mind that the police are doing something, and it reinforces in
the cop's mind that you can succeed. And it sends a clear message to the drug
dealers that we're in this for real, that we are not going to give up. We are
not just going to ride by and pay no attention to what they're doing, giving the
impression that the streets belong to criminals.
Q: Do you think it also sends a message to younger people, especially
from inner-city neighborhoods, who have not yet made a decision about dealing
drugs but might look up to drug dealers who are often status symbols in their
communities?
A: That's a very important question, and it's exactly
what I've been about. During the two years I was commissioner, with the bully
pulpit it provides, I tried to convince not only those in our profession, but
those who study us-the criminologists, the academics, the media, the
public-that, one, police can return to the role for which we were invented:
preventing crime. It's a role we had moved away from and had been "excused" from
having to perform most of the time I was in the business. And two, that police
can control behavior with crime prevention.
Regarding your question about young people, let's take the average
street, say, in East New York [a crime-ridden community in Brooklyn]. Drug gangs
run those streets. Or did. Behavior is learned. If you're a young kid, what
you're seeing every day is not police in charge, not society in charge, but
streets where your family does not feel safe to sit outside, where they pretty
much have to stay in their homes because drug dealers are in control of the
streets. And they're flaunting their power, acting up, drinking, using dope,
using gunplay to fight for control of the corner. So the kids' local heroes are
drug dealers.
When I was a kid growing up in a poor neighborhood, there weren't a lot
of playgrounds, so we hung on the corner. But you didn't drink on the corner,
you didn't urinate on the corner, you didn't raise hell on the corner. Because
if you did, your parents wouldn't stand for it or the cops would kick you off
the corner. And they wouldn't have to be called. If they saw it, they acted on
it.
Q: Can you define Compstat for me, and its contribution in bringing
down crime in New York?
A: Compstat is technology, but it's also
commonsense-a way of looking at how we police.
Compstat comes down to four
basic principles which I would argue need to be the core principles of any
police organization. You need, one, timely accurate intelligence to give you an
idea of what's happening now. In the NYPD they were gathering intelligence three
to four months after the fact.
The second principal is rapid response to what that intelligence is
indicating. With the concern over terrorism right now, how do you defeat
terrorists? Rapid response calls for "site hardening." If you know they're going
to blow up a site, you literally don't give them the chance to do it. You harden
the site to prevent it.
The third aspect is effective tactics. What are the
best tactics to defeat drug dealers? Focus on an area where there's been a spate
of shootings all of the sudden.
Lastly, what's needed is relentless follow-up. So often in policing, we
announce a program and it runs great for a couple of months and then everyone
forgets about it. What we've done at the NYPD is we stay with it. All the
strategies are reviewed a couple of times a year and updated. None of them are
sitting on the shelf.
Q: Some criminologists say New York's crime drop is mainly due to
other factors besides policing. What's your take on that?
A:
They're trying to show that the declines in crime were fueled by changes in the
drug market, demographics, etc. We were pretty much able to shoot down every one
of those arguments because in New York there were several factors at work that
were not as clearly delineated in other areas or in the country as a whole.
There were dramatic, double-digit declines here, much more so than other
areas of the country. And the fact that it happened so quickly when in the
preceding three to four years crime had been going down one, two, three percent.
Why all of a sudden? Demographics can't account for it. All the 12-year-olds
didn't all of a sudden become 24-year-olds. The prison population all of a
sudden didn't double and triple, so that there were no longer people out there
committing crimes. It wasn't the economy. The economy had been improving,
although slowly in New York City. The only thing you could point to is the start
of 1994-you had a new mayor, new police commissioner, new strategies, more
police.
More police definitely helps in New York. But it's how those police are
utilized. And it's not just the police alone who have been responsible, although
we've been a principal catalyst. There is now a comprehensive approach to crime.
Other city agencies pay attention to the quality of life, so they clean up
graffiti, they clean up litter. They enforce their rules and regulations. The
police are never going to deal with this issue alone. It needs to be the police
with the rest of the criminal justice system-the courts and district attorneys
who have come to realize that little things count-and other city agencies who
contribute to the sense that something is different.
Q: How can police around the country apply what you've done, and use
what you've learned?
A: The beauty of it is that it's simple. Yes,
you still have to chase 911 calls. We're still wrestling with the monster of
911. But there's not a police force in America that can't spend more time on
quality of life issues.
Q: When you started as a cop on the beat in 1970, did you have any
inkling of what was to come in your career?
A: No, not at all in
those early days. I think the idea back then in my formative years moving up
was, I'll make sergeant, maybe make detective. And to be quite frank, becoming a
detective was, unlike so many other police, not something that ever really was a
goal for me. I really believe the best detectives have a sixth sense about
things and I didn't have that particular sixth sense. It was a limitation I
recognized in terms of great detectives I knew. I enjoyed the uniformed side of
the business and very early began to gravitate toward the management side. And
that's one of the nice things about policing. There are a number of career paths
to follow.
Q: How is the transition to the private sector going?
A:
Actually it's going quite well. Throughout my career I knew at some point in
time that I would exit the public sector to go into the private sector. That's
always been a goal, a desire for a variety of reasons-new challenges;
financially, there are more opportunities there.
I'm finding, as has been the
case throughout my career, where I've had so many job changes-as chief of
police, commissioner, superintendent-that I have an ability not to look back and
just look forward.
In the looking back, it's not with regrets, it's that you
miss the people, you miss the excitement, but I always understood that it was
going to end. Going into the NYPD, there was the understanding that it would be
a three to four year opportunity, but that at some point in time I would have to
leave. I think I left at just the right time, with a high degree of popularity
and acknowledgment for the success of what we accomplished.
I think in New
York, my legacy-if there's a legacy-will have been for the intense focus on the
importance of quality of life, coupled with strategic direction for police-the
proposition that the police can prevent crime and bring neighborhoods under
control.
Copyright 1997 The Phoenix Mosaic Group, Inc. All rights reserved.